Air strikes and after

The Modi government might still win the war of perceptionwithin India, but India’s conventional deterrence has been compromised. Itswar-fighting capabilities — pivoted on air power — have been blunted without afight. This will have implications for the on-going proxy war by Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Pakistan maintained credibility of both its firstcombined civil-military government and its air power.

   

While Indian political leadership failed, India’s military,this time the Indian Air Force (IAF), saved the day through courage, skill andresolve of its pilots. Moreover, as respect for the seven-decades old MiG-21fighter was restored, all Russian aircraft might now be assessed with addeddeference by India.

By using air power for political and electoral gains, theModi government appears to have scored in the perception war. Three mainarguments being bandied around in its favour are:

(a) It demonstrated extraordinary courage by ordering theIAF to strike inside Pakistan;

(b) The government’s pressure compelled Pakistan to returnthe captured pilot, wing commander Abhinandan Varthaman post-haste, and

(c) International opinion favoured India’s strike forself-defence against Pakistan’s unending terrorism. Being a strong leader,Prime Minister Narendra Modi has created the new normal by use of air power,which done repeatedly like the 2016 (army-led) surgical strikes, would forcePakistan to stop terrorism across the Line of Control. More on this later.

To recapitulate the events, on February 26, the world wasinformed that the IAF had struck at Balakot (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) in the earlyhours, around 3.30am. Following its ‘intelligence-led, non-military strikeavoiding civilian casualties’, the IAF killed ‘a large number of terrorists,their handlers and supports’ and returned safely. With official obfuscationdone, it was left to the ‘reliable’ journalists to spin the unending yarn ofuncorroborated news and theories.

The entire operation, people were informed, was known toonly seven people — the Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, threeservices’ chiefs, and heads of India’s external and internal intelligenceagencies (RAW and IB). RAW identified the target, a Jaish-e-Mohammed seminaryand training camp. The IAF then planned and executed the operation keeping twothings in mind: no aircraft should be lost or intercepted, and the aircraftshould return fast after releasing its payload. It was evident that theoperation was meant for publicity. A case in point, unsubstantiated mediareports claimed that 300 to 350 Jaish terrorists in Balakot were eliminated byIAF strikes, a claim that has since been questioned by the international media,which was allowed by Pakistan to visit the target site. Subsequently, othermedia reports have emerged claiming that the IAF fighters did not actuallycross the Line of Control. Instead, Balakot was attacked using stand-offweapons. Hence, deliberate confusion continues.

Balakot was a well-chosen target since it is hilly, foliagedarea away from habitation; it had the least air defence cover of the PakistanAir Force (PAF). The nearest civilian airfield is 40km away at Muzaffarabad,while the nearest PAF station is over 100km south in Islamabad. Bahawalpur is aknown Jaish stronghold, but since it has four PAF stations in the vicinity, itwas not considered for the strike.

Since the war was neither on, nor imminent, it would havetaken any professional air force (PAF is no exception) minimum 10 minutes fromdetection to reaction and interception. Moreover, the PAF did not have itsairborne early warning aircraft in the air (AWACS cannot stay more than 24hours in air), and the time was such that observers manning the Ground BasedAir Defence System (GBADS) could not have been vigilant (it is not possible toremain on high alert 24×7 in peacetime). Given this setting, the IAF’sMirage-2000 (four instead of the claimed 12) supported by other aircraft withinIndian airspace, breached POK airspace, and released precision guided payloadsat stand-off range well before the PAF could scramble and intercept them. TheIAF had surprised the PAF and shocked Pakistan.

Waking up to reality, Pakistan realised that India hadbreached POK airspace and delivered bombs within its sovereign territory. Thiswas a first. Use of land-based artillery firings had remained within POKterritory. The optics of India’s action had demoralised Pakistanis revelling inthe strength of their first civil-military government with defined division ofwork.

Pakistan was faced with the dilemma of how to avenge India’sunprecedented action: to use or not to use the PAF. It was decided that the PAFtoo would breach the Indian airspace while calling it a non-military strike.Unlike the IAF, the PAF strike would be done with menacing force in broaddaylight ensuring that Indian military installations close to the Line ofControl were not damaged enough to compel India to raise the ante.

The PAF package comprising 24 combat aircraft struck nextmorning on February 27 with a few breaching Indian airspace. They werechallenged, dogfight ensued, which resulted in the downing of one Pakistanifighter and capture of an Indian pilot (who had to eject from his MiG-21 insidePOK) by Pakistan. Briefing the media on February 27 evening, the Indianmilitary delegation said that Pakistan had done military aggression by seekingto hit military installations. They admitted that it was an act of war. Whenasked how India would respond, the reply was that India was prepared for allcontingencies. Left unsaid was that unless PAF provoked further, the matter wasover.

Here are four observations on what happened during the twofateful days. One, the expensive Israeli SPICE (Smart Precise Impact and CostEffective) guidance kit converts dump/unguided bombs into smart guidedair-to-surface munitions dropped from 60km stand-off ranges with accuracy ofless than three meters. These SPICE kits were fitted on 2,000 pounds (about900kg) bombs and dropped by Mirage aircraft. Since the distance from the LC (itwas breached in Muzaffarabad sector) to Balakot was 90km, the Mirage, given the60km stand-off ammunition range, would have done shallow breaches (maximum30km) and delivered the payload. The air raid would have been over in less thanfive minutes. While the Mirage remained in POK airspace, the bombs hitPakistani territory. Moreover, SPICE-bombs, given its accuracy, requireDesignated Mean point of Impact (DMI); in this case, it would have been givenan area target to avoid collateral damage.

Since the purpose of such use of air power was raising theprofile of the government, no new ‘red-lines’, as expostulated by analysts,were created. It would be nigh impossible for the IAF to do another such strikewithout a war. All talks of a ‘new normal’ in counter-terrorism operationscrafted by the Modi government are baloney.

Two, against India’s non-military strike, the PAF respondedwith military aggression in daytime, which India said was an act of war. Whydid India not respond to Pakistan’s act of war with offensive counter-strikes?Because the political leadership and the IAF were not prepared for an escalationwhich could have easily led to a full-blown war, whose dynamics areuncontrollable. Pakistan, given its aggression, was ready for an escalation.

The Indian leadership is unprepared for war because it doesnot understand the dynamics of war-fighting, including transition ofconventional war to use of nuclear weapons. The Modi government was worried bya powerful message from Pakistan on the day IAF had struck. On February 26,Pakistan held a meeting of its National Command Authority (NCA), the highestcivil-military leaders’ body chaired by the Prime Minister which purportedlydecides on nuclear issues. In reality, the purpose of the NCA is limited tosignalling since all aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are controlled bythe Pakistan Army. Pakistan has declared full-spectrum capability: nuclearweapons capability for all three — strategic, operational/war-fighting, andbattles/ tactical levels — of war.

The IAF (and other services) do not have adequate capacityand capability for war escalation; the equipment and ammunition shortages arewell-documented and are not hidden from Pakistan. In the 1999 Kargil conflict,where the army chief, General V.P. Malik said ‘we will fight with whatever wehave’, India was lucky since Musharraf had kept his leadership in the dark. In2001-2002, India lost nearly 1,084 soldiers (to shifting land-mines) withoutfiring a shot and blinked first; in 2008 Mumbai attacks, India was once againstcaught unawares; and in 2016, India bluffed with its fake surgical strikes.

Moreover, since war would be a joint-services effort, it isnot even clear whether the army or the air force would be the lead service inthe land war. Worse, the army, unwilling to give up counter-terrorismoperations, has failed to focus on its primary task of war-fighting. Indianmilitary lacks reforms, and the indigenous defence-industrial complex ispathetic to say the least.

Given the abysmal state of military preparedness, thequestion is: why did the Modi government order air strikes when the IAF, letalone escalation dominance, lacks escalation-fighting capabilities? Pakistan’sbelligerent reaction to the IAF’s strike has compromised India’s conventionaldeterrence predicated on air power.

Three, an interesting observation has been made by army’sformer director general military operations, Lt Gen. Vinod Bhatia. He wrote ontwitter: ‘Pak air force employed on targets within their artillery range. Younever employ air assets where ground-based weapons are effective. Pak strikeswere for domestic compulsions and optics.’

The PAF strikes were meant to maintain credibility of itsair power and to disallow shrinking of conventional warfighting space. In thetechnology-driven modern war, the air force, and not the army would haveprimacy for desirable war outcome. The core competencies of air powercomprising its enormous reach, unmatched flexibility, information superiority,precision engagements, and air and space superiority are not available to theland forces.

If Pakistan had responded to India’s air strike withland-based artillery systems, its air power credibility would have eroded. Thiswould in turn have signalled that Pakistan would be willing to use its nukesearly in a war. Despite its declared full-spectrum capability, Pakistanmilitary, given its elongated geography and too many high-profile assets closeto the border, would desist from early use of nuclear weapons in war. Nukes arenot central to Pakistan’s war-fighting. To maintain this posture, Pakistan hasto ensure parity at the operational (or war-fighting) level of conventionalwar.

Thus, it does not matter whether the PAF undertook shallowbreach of the LC in the February 27 strikes. What mattered was that itresponded with air power and that too in daylight. What appeared a tit-for-tatequal and proportionate response helped maintain conventional warfightingspace, and strengthened Pakistani people’s confidence in the Imran Khangovernment.

Four, once the above objectives were achieved, Pakistan tookthe high-moral ground and returned the captured Indian pilot for regionalpeace. Pakistan’s strategy was supported and influenced by China. The US, SaudiArabia and UAE do not have much influence on Pakistan to goad it to review itsnational security strategy. Pakistan foreign minister Mahmood Qureshi twicespoke with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, which resulted in China’s criticismof India’s Balakot strike. The Chinese foreign ministry statement released onFebruary 28 said that sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nationsshould be respected.

China’s finger-pointing was on Balakot; Indian bombs hadsevered Pakistan’s sovereignty. Beijing had seemingly given a go-ahead toPakistan to undertake PAF strikes, following which, Pakistan was asked tocomply with the regional peace agenda. China not only wants peace between Indiaand Pakistan, it also wants India to get on the Belt and Road Initiative.

Reading between the lines, the National Security Advisor,Ajit Doval, was in constant touch with his American counterpart John Bolton.Before the Indian strike in Balakot, Bolton, reacting to the Pulwama tragedy inKashmir, had spoken about India’s right to self-defence. After the Pakistanistrikes, it was US President Donald Trump who had mentioned about the end ofthe crisis between India and Pakistan.

The Indian action of involving the US in crisis withPakistan to avert war is not new. The former US secretary of state, CondoleezzaRice wrote in her book: No Higher Honour that the National Security Advisor inthe Vajpayee government, Brajesh Mishra called her to help avert a war betweenIndia and Pakistan in May 2002 during Operation Parakram. Like the thenVajpayee government, the Modi government too sought refuge in the US administrationto end the crisis it created solely for effect and image management.

(The writer is editor FORCE news magazine) pravin@forceindia.net

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