The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 changed the balance of power in south Asia. This development probably ended India’s conventional military superiority. Many strategic experts believe that nuclear tests have frustrated India’s capacity to react to Pakistan’s constant provocations. India’s Kargil dilemma clearly demonstrated it. Indian military response during the crisis was confined to its territory only. During the crisis Indian air force was given clear instructions not to cross the Line of Control (LoC).
India’s capacity to retaliate below the nuclear threshold was again tested after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Former National Security advisor, Shivshankar Menon wrote in his book ‘Choices: Inside the making of India’s Foreign Policy’ that in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack, he as the foreign secretary and Pranab Mukherjee, the then External Affairs Minister, were in favour of retaliatory strikes inside Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. But the plan could not be executed.
Over the years Indian strategic community came up with different ideas on how to deal with ‘cross-border terrorism’. After the Kargil war Indian military and political leaders suggested that despite nuclearization India has the space to fight a limited conventional war. The wisdom was that without the worry of escalation India can afford a conventional war with Pakistan. The idea couldn’t gain much traction afterwards.
Again, after the 2001 Parliament attack Indian Army came up with the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine’. The doctrine envisages that India would station sufficient troops at the border to start offensive operations immediately in case of a major terror attack in India, without waiting for a full-scale mobilization. Such offensives would be in the form of multiple but shallow attacks across the entire India-Pakistan border before the international community could intervene. Reportedly, several exercises were conducted to test out the elements of ‘Cold Start’ doctrine but it was never put into use. The civilian governments were also reluctant to own such a doctrine.
The key paradox facing the Indian decision-makers is not so much the speed with which Indian forces could be mobilized, as envisaged by the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, but the question of whether there are any military solutions to deal with cross-LoC incursions.
After the Uri attack, the Director General of Military Operations declared that the Indian army had conducted surgical strikes across the LoC. Mr. Menon believes that it is wrong to invoke the term ‘surgical strikes’ with the post-Uri retaliation: “It is a phrase developed by the US in the nuclear context. It had a very specific meaning — taking out the adversaries’ nuclear weapons through surgical strike and eliminate those weapons.” It is more appropriate to call it a limited operation. Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani military expert, reported in The Wire that the Indian troops crossed over not more than 200 meters inside the Pakistani side of the LoC to attack an LeT camp located some 100 metres away from an army check post at Dudhnial. She holds that it was a limited scale operation which made it possible for Pakistan to call this as nothing more than firing and a border violation.
In the aftermath of Uri a new narrative was building up in favour of overt retaliation in case of another major provocation from Pakistan based groups. Ashley J. Tellis wrote an opinion piece in the livemint where he opined that the threat of major military action—one that suffices to punish the Pakistani military but also poses risks of significant escalation—remains the most effective means available to India for inviting the kind of international censure that could force the Pakistani military to reconsider its links with jihadi terrorism. On the other hand, former foreign secretary of Pakistan, Aizaz Chaudhary, stated in late 2015 that Pakistan is formalizing its plans to use low-yield nuclear bombs (tactical nuclear weapons) to forestall any advance of Indian troops under the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.
Pulwama attack was a watershed moment. It led to the deaths of more than 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel. Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility for the attack. Two weeks after the attack, Indian Air Force crossed the LoC and allegedly attacked militant bases deep inside Pakistan in Balakot. The very next day Pakistani jets dropped few payloads in Jammu and Kashmir in an act of revenge. They were chased away by Indian MiG-21 jets. In the ensuing dogfight one MiG 21 was downed and Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman was taken into custody by the Pakistani army. The crisis was soon defused after Pakistani authorities released Abhinandan within a few days of his arrest.
The Balakot incident has some clear signals: India has overcome the doctrine of strategic restraint; Pakistan has shown willingness to escalate the crisis; and Kashmir conflict could trigger a war between the nuclear weapon states of India and Pakistan. What could be Indian response in the event of another Pulwama or Mumbai like incident? We are surely living in “interesting times.”
The writer teaches Political Science at GDC Women Anantnag. (Views are personal)