The first half of 2019 is over. It’s time to assess what allhas append in the past six months in Jammu and Kashmir, and how that will playout in the future. While doing so, we should be accountable to our conscienceand assess the things in an objective manner rather than being political oremotional about it.
This year began against the backdrop of the military claimthat more than 240 militants had been killed in 2018 and there was also anunusually high number of more than 100 soldiers/ policemen killed during thesame period. The statistics tell a story but that is never complete in a sensethat one soldier’s death is considered equal to that of four militants. Therewas a complete mismatch. Statistically, there was a need to think why it wasso? There was hardly any time with the strategists to reflect over it. Such ananalysis was important also necessary to see what the ground situation had tonarrate. Guns and grenades, and the number of deaths are just one part of theground situation, not the whole of it.
A psychology to kill and get killed is at work. Theelimination of the militants, and the attendant stone-pelting protests that areoften described as clashes, and the funeral processions were dominating thenarrative. It was not a one-day narrative, it was recurring. The visuals thatplayed out on social media were doing the job of indoctrination of the youngminds and they started preparing themselves for bigger attacks. This mindsetwas not known to many, not even the immediate family members of the young boyswho were getting recruited as militants. In fact, there was less or noknowledge about the things taking beyond the visible surface.
Then came February 14 Pulwama terror attack in which 40 CRPFpersonnel were killed. The attack jolted the whole set up of the complacencyand the pleasure that they were drawing from the mounting casualty figure ofmilitants. The attack that was retaliated with aerial strike in Balakot inPakistan, brought forth many flaws in the system – and one of the biggestshortcoming that came to light was that there was no real assessment of theground situation. It may be dubbed as intelligence failure, but it is not anappropriate term. The intelligence failure means that the flow of informationthat should have come from the identified or formal sources was not there orinformal sources failed to inform the security agencies. And, even if they did,the information was inadequate. There were other flaws as well, which couldhave been checked by not allowing such a huge movement of convoy on the sameday. But, in reality, it was that the situation was not read in properperspective. The circumstances in which suicide bomber Adil Dar did what hedid, its background, and the people working behind him, were not known. It wasonly after the attack took place that links were looked into and finally,eliminated.
Come what may, Pulwama and its aftermath cannot be taken outof the calendar of 2019 because that exists as a painful reality. The successin the anti-militancy operations in the post-Pulwama terror attack also cannotmeasured merely by the number of the militants killed – 125 or so so far in theyear. Most of them were killed post-February 14, as the security forcesintensified their operations and did the targeted killings. There were lesserincidents of stone throwing, or the clashes following encounters. And, even ifthose were there, the visual impact was reduced. That, however, is not the endgame.
First of all, the number of recognized or listed faces ofmilitants keep on changing, with no recruitment taking place. It would bedeceiving ourselves if we think that the militant’s recruitment is zero – bothin terms of those picking up guns and also those who are making up or have madeup their mind to join the violent campaign. This is not a complete picture of the militancy that has emerged in2019, but it does provide glimpse of what is happening on the ground.
Politically, Kashmir has seen massive changes in the 2019,it remains to be seen how relevant the two regional parties National Conferenceand PDP would be in the future scheme of things. They are looking for issuesand also the support of their cadre as they used to do in the past. Added tothat is the entry of new players – some had entered in 2009-2014 formally,others in the beginning of this year. There is a struggle going on and thegoals are elusive. This is the biggest challenge that has emerged on thepolitical terrain in Kashmir and it indicates that the things are much morecomplex than ever before.