Let me put it straight. This article is not intended todefend or reprimand historical figures. It is intended to be a defence ofhistory and history-writing. The ongoing debate involves two viewpoints locatedat opposite poles: one defends SMA and the other lambasts him. Singh coins theterm ‘Narrativists’ for those who consider Abdullah solely responsible for thetribulations experienced by Kashmiris; his viewpoint is branded ‘hagiographic’and ‘statist’ by the other side. While Singh elevates Sheikh to the stature ofa Messiah, Khwaja and Ahanger, seconding the illustrious Haque’s rhetoricalarguments, ascribe monstrosity to him. As a student of history, I dare tocontest that both these viewpoints are essentially biased narratives which reston the false and amplified assumption that SMA was the only one whose actionsdecided the course of the history of Kashmir.
To be fair to Mr. Singh, much of the content of his articlesis rooted in evidence. For example, his arguments about the nature of MuslimConference’s politics during the 1930s, Congress’ support to agrarian reforms,and the absence of the notion of independence in the pre-1940s’ Kashmiridiscourse are based on verifiable facts. However, while Mr. Singh cautions usthat “misrepresenting historical facts is essential to narratives”, he oddlycommits the same blunder in presenting his perspective. For instance, healleges that the revived Muslim Conference (c. 1941) had “no sympathy for thedemands of Kashmir’s Muslims.” However, he does not introduce us to themeasuring rod that he used to conclude this. His assertion that “Quit Kashmircarried the seeds of an independent Kashmir” may be partly true. In amemorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission (1946), the NC proposed theretention of the Maharaja as a Constitutional Head. After Sheikh was arrested,he endorsed the proposal in a court trial. Further, Singh chooses a random dateand thing—the screening of Omar Mukhtar in 1986—that supposedly “undid” thelegacy of Sheikh and, therefore, completely ignores the earlier dissentingvoices and the pre-1989 frail acts of armed resistance.
Similarly, while the Aligarian duo accuse Mr. Singh of”academic dishonesty” and ask him to “re-read Sheikh Abdullah in an objectiveand impartial way”, their narrative is not, by any stretch of imagination,objective and impartial. I hate to break it to them but theirs is not a”re-reading” of history since this narrative has been in fashion for decades.This narrative may be populist and politically-correct, but historically notso. At least one of their arguments (“if ever he [SMA] did anythingsubstantial”) vividly reveals their adherence to historical negationism. Onemight ask, if Abdullah never did anything substantial, why would hiscontemporaries write accolades in his honour? Why would Bazaz and Mian YarAhmed, respectively, address him as Kashmir ka Gandhi and Quaid-e Azam? And whywould both the leadership and the people celebrate him as Sher-i Kashmir?
Prior to this unreasonable claim, the authors refer to “a considerablesection of Muslims” who resented Sheikh and followed Abbas. They, perhapsproudly, assert that the Quit Kashmir campaign launched in 1946 demanded “thecomplete end of autocratic rule of Dogras.” This backfires at their entirenarrative. First, it was Sheikh, the despised one, and his fellow NC memberswho launched the movement. Second, MC and other rival groups of NC backed offand fell into the trap of indirectly supporting the continuance of the Dograrule. Pertinently, Abbas discredited ‘Quit Kashmir’ under Jinnah’s instructionswhile Nehru opposed it on the pretext of respecting the policy of the AISPCwhich aimed at the establishment of ‘responsible government’ in princelystates, and not complete independence.
In his response, Singh claims that “Ghulam Abbas wantedPakistan not Azadi.” Contrarily, Christopher Snedden’s study suggests that tillJuly 1947, the MC expressed opinions in favour of an independent Kashmir underthe aegis of the Maharaja. Even Abdullah, who is generally blamed to have”persuaded” the Maharaja into acceding to India, made public statements thatwould translate to “independence before accession.”
Mr. Z.G. Muhammad’s piece is also driven by a deep contemptfor Sheikh and lesser regard for history-writing. He arbitrarily traces thebeginning of the “nationalist” movement in Kashmir “patterned after the INC” toa supposed “agreement” between Sheikh and Nehru in 1937. He completelyobfuscates two significant facts: that after each of the first three sessionsof the MC (1932-34), Sheikh would go over to the plains to consult with theIndian leadership; and that immediately after attending the 1934 session of theCentral Legislative Assembly, he expressed his wish to launch aCongress-inspired organisation. ZGM. points out that the conversion of MC intoNC was not a unanimous decision. He deliberately disregards the fact that afterexhaustive parleying on the issue, only one MC member voted against theconversion. In fact, Abbas, initially one among the dissenters, later declaredthat the objectors to conversion were the ones who opposed the MC itself. Hecontinued to be a member of the NC and did not revive the MC until after theMuslim League passed the Lahore Resolution in 1940.
One could also argue that after the dissenting voicesresigned from the NC from 1940 onwards, Sheikh’s political decisionsencountered little resistance from the leaders who now encircled him. Thisarguably provided larger space to his anti-Jinnah and pro-Congressinclinations.
The two conflicting narratives awkwardly seem to shake handson three points. One, by attributing nearly every trough and crest of thehistory of Kashmir to Sheikh’s decisions, they completely reduce the otherpolitical actors to deadwood. Two, both resort to writing history backwards.This is not methodologically wrong but the crucial criterion is to objectivelytrace the origins of the present situation in a historical past rather thancherry-pick facts to fit them into a presentist narrative. Three, both mostlyoffer simplistic explanations for complex historical phenomena.
To conclude, the creation of narratives is not the primaryfunction of history-writing. History is essentially a multifaceted record ofthe past that provides insights into the evolution of a society into itspresent form. It serves as our collective memory. Narratives, by not adheringto the rules that are sacred to the discipline, tend to skew this memory.Historical phenomena are ordinarily multi-causal in nature and they take placein specific contexts. By over-emphasizing Sheikh’s role, we have continuallymissed the forest for the trees. Our historians have habitually desisted fromasking some uncomfortable questions. For instance, what if other politicalgroups had thrown their weight behind the Naya Kashmir Manifesto or the QuitKashmir Movement? What if both NC and the revived-MC had not engaged inaccepting political counsel from outside? If Sheikh was the “sole soulresponsible for the hell we are in”, how can we convincingly explain thecontinuance of Delhi’s control on Kashmir during his long incarceration? Why isour sense of history permeated by the stories of exaggerated heroism andvillainy? Surely, in this war of narratives, history is turning into acasualty. For ages, we have suffered injustices from several quarters. Let usnot be, in turn, unjust to our history!
Suhail-ul-Rehman Lone is a Senior Research Fellow at theCentre of Advanced Study, Department of History, AMU. His area ofspecialization includes the freedom struggle and the agrarian history ofpre-1947 J&K.