Proxies in Afghanistan

Why, at all, a landlocked and backward county likeAfghanistan has been on the world chessboard since the 19th century? Why againregional powers like India and Pakistan have made it a theatre of theirproxies? I contend that they do it primarily for their own and secondarily forthe interests of Afghanistan.  

The British and the Soviets occupied Afghanistan in the pastfor imperial and colonial pursuits. The US invaded it in 2001 ostensibly for’War against the Global Terror’, though the critics see beneath it a hidden USsecurity and economic agenda.

   

India and Pakistan also dabble in Afghan jumble to settletheir scores on Kashmir, since Taliban support Kashmir’s secessionism fromIndia and perceive relocating a 2001-like theocratic Islamic state inAfghanistan, which India contests, fearing that it would radicalise Kashmir andendanger its national security interests.

Besides, India’s interest is to project its presence inAfghanistan to deflate Pakistan-Taliban anti-India diction, checkmate China andPakistan and promote trade and traffic with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Pakistan’s interest is to forge a government of its ownchoice in Afghanistan, with which to sustain its own influence and marginalizethat of India, exploit Taliban as a stratagem against India, establish connectwith Central Asia for trade etc. and involve Afghanistan in the CPEC regionaleconomic integration project.  

For their varying interests, both countries are holdingdiametrically opposite positions in Afghanistan, and are pursuing mutualproxies with designated strategies and counterstrategies. Their proxiesrevealed during the post-Soviet Afghan Civil War (1989-1990) among variouswarring factions.  While India staked thenon-Pashtun groups of Northern Alliance, Pakistan, with the Saudi support,backed the Pashtuns/Taliban for power control. 

With the end-Civil War and Taliban power-take in 1996,Pakistan’s Afghan space widened and that of India squeezed.  However, India resurfaced after the US Afghaninvasion and the toppling of Taliban regime in 2001. The US solicitedcooperation of international community including that of India and Pakistan tofight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and reconstruct post-2001 Afghanistan under theBonn Agreement.

Yet, recognising Pakistan as a strategic partner in the saidfight, the US floated it sufficient funds and security assistance and endorsedits position on Kashmir by differentiating between Kashmir militancy and globalterrorism.  However, sometime after, the US-Pakistanrelations experienced a chill due to the alleged Pakistan’s ‘double dealing’during the counterinsurgency. Consequently, it suspended all securityassistance to Pakistan; denied training to its military personnel, legitimisedIndia’s involvement in Afghanistan and took U-turn on Kashmir by equatingKashmir militancy with global terrorism.

Seizing the opportunity, India owned the Kabul government bysupplying it necessary military hardware; funds for building institution, dams,roads and energy power plants; investing in mining copper and iron ores andrailways; developing skill and human resource capacity, commissioning directcargo flights from its major cities to Kabul and Kandhar and transportingessential food grains via an alternate Chabahar-bound Iranian route. SinceIndia-Afghanistan trade and traffic is disallowed on Pakistan soil, theChahbahar project is becoming crucial for India’s connect with Afghanistan andEurasia and also for its intersection with India-Iran-Russia internationalNorth-South Transport Corridor. Diplomatically, it is trying hard to isolatePakistan for its alleged role in regional insurgency, pulling thereby nopunches to undercut Pakistan in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan reciprocates by underscoring that Pak-Afghantrust-deficit and Afghan-Pakistan cross-border violence is because of IndianRAW agency. It is thus resituating its trade, transport and security (APAPPS2018) cooperation with Afghanistan, helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan to reclaim their dignity and offering toopen up the Torkham border 24×7 to build the mutual trust and securitycooperation. To gain regional support, it is joining hands with once its enemyRussia. Eventually, Russia legitimises Pakistan as a ‘dominant regional actor’and a ‘valuable’ partner for combating regional and global terrorism anddrug-trafficking. Even Pakistan is rejigging its relations with Iran to thwartthe ISIS and reassure Iran’s support on Kashmir. However, the robust Pak-Iranrelations are impeded by the Pak-Saudi tie up, Pak-Iran cross-border insurgencyand Iran-India energy and transport deals.

These Iran-India deals had sometime past become susceptibleto the US Iran economic sanctions. For Afghanistan, however, the US allowedIndia to continue work on the Chabahar project. But, it bound it to halt totaloil supply within six month of its sanctions announcement. While, complyingwith the US sanctions, India is exploring other options, including worth $5billion oil imports from the US annually.

But, China is unlikely to toe the US line for compulsions ofits acute energy crisis and growing trade war with the US, besides availing thegiven opportunity of buying cheap Iranian oil due to its shrinking buyers aftertotal us embargo on Iran. It is making it still cheaper by transporting it viathe shortest and economical trans-surface CPEC than the long South Pacificmaritime route. In this situation, Chabahar is becoming a route fortransporting only ‘non-sanctioned’ Indian goods to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, trudging mutual ‘love hate conundrum’, theUS-Pakistan re-engaged for Afghan peace under the ‘US Format’ led by itsspecial envoy, Zalamy Khalilzad, though Russia initiated its own ‘MoscowFormat’ for almost the same purpose. Pakistan, for the US pressure and the CPECsecurity, is proactively persuading Taliban to shun violence and engage withKhalilzad. Hopes of peace are surging fast for the unabated US-Taliban peacetalks, presupposing its ‘significant progress”, as Trump announced troops’withdrawal, Taliban agreed power-sharing with the non-Pashtuns and Pakistancommitted unstinted support to the process a success. 

The US is keen about its immediate end-results to exitAfghanistan and save $50 billion annual expenses on the Afghan war. Taliban isdesirous of peace, this time than ever before, to come out of the ‘warfatigue’, strike a better deal for reoccupying 50% of the territory lost in2001 and lessen Pakistan pressure.

However, the final peace agreement has severalinsurmountable complications. Taliban is averse to talks with the ‘puppet’Kabul government, enforce ceasefire until total US troops’ leave Afghanistanand compromise with its hard line Islamic approach about the stateformation. 

Equally important are other issues: Can a power-sharing government with Taliban domination sustain, knowing that it is a ‘gun-toting force’ than a real Afghan face? What would be the fate of the militant groups created by the US during its fight with Taliban?  Can the US so easily allow its influence to ebb with its total troops’ withdrawal? Analysts contend that the ‘precipitous troops could risk-war gains’? Can it retain its Afghan bases and how would Russia and China respond? Would the US reinvade Afghanistan in case Taliban back out from its given promise to redeem its soil from other militant groups? How would new government account for the Daesh and the treat of the militants groups created and paid by the US over the years? What can be the future Afghan-Iran relations? Assumption is that the US may, now, reuse Taliban against Iran, since it has offered employment and security to Taliban.  Shall Pakistan cherish the same influence on Taliban as it had in the past, considering its ‘behind-the-scenes’ munificent support to the US-Taliban Peace initiative?

More important, shall India-Pakistan proxy terminate withthe peace agreement, and can it pre-empt their resolution of Kashmir as bothconflicts have a co-relationship?  Whatwould be the status of India’s Afghan stakes and investments, including its$315 million Chabahar-bound transport project with Iran? Rumours are that theproject can puncture for Iran’s internal crisis or the could-be-US-Talibanpatch up. How would those Taliban behave to whom the Jihad (holy war) is a wayof life? Reportedly, they perceive to redirect their energies towards Kashmir,once free from Afghanistan. The Indian government is ready to reckon with sucha spill over from Afghanistan. 

Tailpiece:

Undeniably, compared to India, Pakistan’s Afghan space is foreseento swell after the peace agreement. But, it won’t make India either irrelevantto Afghanistan, since it is a partner to a number of internationally-announcedregional economic integration projects for and over Afghanistan. In addition,it is the fast growing Asian economy after China, and can contribute to theAfghanistan’s economic development more than Pakistan. This warrants India andPakistan to complement each other to wash out nascent Afghan people fromperpetual pangs and tribulations. May be, it will open up vistas for the settlement of Kashmir issue, sooner orlater.   

mushtaqkaw@gmail.com

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