Virtual as Actual

Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual summit with his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison on June 4. Multilateral virtual summits have been held during the COVID-19 pandemic such as SAARC on March 15 and G 20 on March 26. Modi has also been in telephonic contact with a large number of world leaders. This was, however, different. It was bilateral. It aimed and succeeded in reaching full outcomes in terms of joint declarations and agreements. Thus, it was innovative and pioneering.

Briefing the media on the summit Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs disclosed that two leaders “talked about virtual becoming the new norm in the times of the global pandemic domestically as well as in terms of the outreach to leaders across the world”. There is little doubt that more and more virtual diplomatic interactions will take place even after the pandemic ends but leaders as well as diplomats would continue to value personal real interaction because often understandings are reached not in formal discussions but in quiet conversations where personal interaction is of critical importance.

   

India and Australia decided to upgrade their 2009 Strategic Partnership to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). The 49 paragraph Joint Statement of the summit noted “The CSP is based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and the rule of law”. These fine words are indicative of a desire to give substantial content to the relationship in diverse areas including defence and security. They also reflect the vast transformation in Australia’s approach towards India.

As a close United States ally it was largely indifferent if not latently hostile towards India during the Cold War. India remained peripheral to its interests in the 1990s too. No wonder it behaved in a most uncouth manner towards India after the nuclear tests of 1998. While many countries condemned the Indian action for it had shattered the global nuclear order it was Australia whose insulting behaviour had led to deep anger in the Indian establishment. The bitterness remained for a long time and only finally drained away after Australia made an exception in 2016 to its laws to allow the export of uranium for India’s civil nuclear programme.

In response to a question at a briefing after the summit Secretary (East) clarified “There was no discussion on China in the Virtual Summit”. That well may have been the case but there is no doubt that China and its assertive if not aggressive conduct was present in the background. Indeed, that is evident from the summit declarations. Without naming China, they reflect agreement on some issues relating to its positions and actions on which India and Australia are wary. These include China’s handling of COVID-19 from the time it emerged there, to the World Health Organisation, to the observance of rules of global governance particularly in the maritime domain.

On COVID-19 the two countries decided “to reflect on the recommendations of the independent and comprehensive evaluation of the international response to COVID-19”. In view of Australia’s strong move to have such an assessment, this formulation, in itself, targets China while maintaining a large degree of deniability. This is so because China had taken great offence to the Australian demand for a scrutiny of how WHO had handled COVID-19 and if China had acted in time to share information with it.

The summit reiteration on the need for a rules based global order is also significant. It reflects the great concern generally through Asia that China is ignoring established norms and rules of global governance when it suits its interests. This is witnessed in China’s disdain for the decisions of international tribunals on the South China Sea which has drawn countries like India, Australia and Japan closer together over the past decade. They have now decided to upgrade the Quad arrangement which also includes the United States to ministerial level. During this bilateral summit India and Australia issued a Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The Australian Foreign Ministry emphasised that it committed both countries to support “a rules based maritime order in the region”. It remains to seen though how far the two countries would be willing to translate intentions into practice.

A Framework Arrangement on Cyber and Cyber-Enabled Critical Technology Cooperation was signed during the summit. It seeks to inter alia promote a secure and open internet and look at cyber security challenges. It also stresses that critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and robotics are, according to the Australian foreign ministry “guided by international standards to ensure that they do not present risks to security or prosperity”. These are good objectives and have to be voiced by countries such as India and Australia but the fact remains that in these frontier technology areas the United States dominates and China is attempting to catch up. Hence, realistically what kind of a role can the two countries play?

Australia now recognises India’s importance to its economy. India is Australia’s fifth largest export market. It aims to take it to the third position and has identified export areas and Indian states to target for this purpose. Australia has also become an important destination for Indian students with around 1,10,000 present. They are an important source of income for many Australian educational institutions. Over the years the Indian community has also grown. It now numbers more than 6 lakhs and has grown in the decades since the end of the White-Australia policy in 1973 with professionals migrating to that country. In these decades Australia has also attempted to integrate more with the region but continues to be an Anglo-American outpost in the southern hemisphere. That notwithstanding there are now large areas of coincidence of Indian and Australian interests.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

four × 4 =