During the last two decades, eachmilitary crisis between India and Pakistan has been followed by attempts atdiplomatic rapprochement, which have turned out to be fiascos. The twocountries go through sporadic peacemaking efforts, characterized bynegotiations. For instance, in January 2004, the then Indian prime minister,Atal BihariVajpayee, and the then Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf, agreed”to the resumption of a composite dialogue” on all issues “including Jammu andKashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” Musharraf assured the Indiangovernment that he would not permit “any territory under Pakistan’s control tobe used to support terrorism in any manner” (The Hindu, 6 January 2004).But this joint statement could not mitigate the existing skepticism.
Despite international pressure,the India–Pakistan crisis has not been defused; on the contrary, it is highlyvolatile. Given their interests in South Asia, Russia, China, the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have expressed concern aboutthe brinksmanship between the two countries. In order to facilitate arapprochement, President Vladimir Putin of Russia offered to play the role ofmediator between then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and then PakistaniPresident Musharraf at the scheduled regional summit conference in Almaty,Kazakhistan in 2002. Both Putin and the then Chinese president, Jiang Zemin,held talks with Vajpayee and Musharraf in order to create a space for politicalnegotiations. But the two heads of state continued to remain aloof anduncompromisingly condemned each other’s belligerence. The one positive outcomeof the summit talks, however, was the proposal of the Indian government forjoint patrolling of the Line of Control (LoC) by Indian and Pakistani forces.But the Pakistani government was quick to reject this proposal and expressedthe requirement for building a third-party force instead. Subsequently, thelethal and hitherto readily adopted practice of maneuvering a dangeroussituation to the limits of tolerance mellowed, due to Vajpayee’s andMusharraf’s judicious approach to nuclear warfare. But the simmering grievancesbetween India and Pakistan, and the distress of the Kashmiri people, remainedunredressed.
Subsequent to the Kargil Conflictbetween India and Pakistan in May-June 1999, Washington’s incrimination ofPakistani aggression mitigated New Delhi’s fear that internationalization ofthe Kashmir dispute would spell unambiguous victory for Pakistan. India’sstrategy of diplomacy and restraint increased the international pressure onPakistan to withdraw its forces from Indian territory. India took recourse tolimited conventional war under nuclear conditions, prior to President Clinton’sMarch 2000 visit to New Delhi. At this point in time, proliferation wasrelegated to the background in Indo–U.S. relations.
U.S. strategic ties with New Delhi were further consolidated in the wake of 11 September 2001, when the links between militant Islamic groups and Pakistan’s military and militia forces were underscored. As one of the consequences of the decision of the Bush administration to eliminate Al-Qaeda and its supporters in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s then General Pervez Musharaff found himself with no option but to sever ties with the Taliban. Following this drastically changed policy decision to withdraw political and military support from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Islamabad found itself unable to draw a clear line of distinction between “terrorists” in Afghanistan and “freedom fighters” in Kashmir. Islamabad’s quandary proved New Delhi’s trump card.
New Delhi was able to justify its military stance vis-à-vis Pakistan in the wake of the attacks on the J & K State Assembly in the summer capital, Srinagar, in October 2001, and then the attacks on the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, a month later. New Delhi’s strategy was validated by U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and the deployment of U.S. forces in and around Pakistan to restrain Pakistani aggression. India was assured by the United States that it would stall any attempt by Pakistan to extend the Kashmir dispute beyond local borders, which might disrupt its operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Also, deployment of the U.S. military in Pakistani air bases strengthened New Delhi’s confidence that Islamabad would hesitate to initiate nuclear weapons use (Kampani 2002).
The result of India’s policy of coercive diplomacy was that the Musharraf regime was pressured by the United States to take strict military action against the mercenary and militant Islamic groups bolstering the insurgency in Kashmir (Armitage 2002). New Delhi was successful in getting Islamabad to both privately and publicly renounce its support of insurgents in J & K.
India and Pakistan routinelybrandish their nuclear capabilities to intimidate each other. The two countrieshave also resorted to direct nuclear signaling through ballistic-missile tests.Such strategies emphasize the military and political volatility in South Asia (Dawn,27 December 2001).
India’s concern probably is thata limited war will not enable it to accomplish substantive political ormilitary objectives; that such a war might spin out of control and would beimpossible to cease according to the wishes of the administration and themilitary; that India might find itself in disfavor with and spurned by theinternational community; and that a war might beef up nuclear armament. Andtoday, the United States requires Pakistan to facilitate negotiations with theTaliban in order to draw up a roadmap for peace between Afghans and the Afghangovernment and militants and expedite the withdrawal of US troops fromAfghanistan. And with China heavily invested in CPEC, the bilateral projectdesigned to improve infrastructure within Pakistan for more efficient tradewith China and further integrate the countries of the region, India’s claims toisolate Pakistan don’t make much sense.
The impending menace ofprecipitative nuclearization has been one of the many factors underlining thenecessity to maintain a quasi-stable regime in the South Asian region. Ineffect, one of the ramifications of India and Pakistan climbing the ladder ofnuclear proliferation has been a tottering stability, maintained amidst thecontinuing conflict in Kashmir.
Indian and Pakistani nationalismsdeploy the idea of citizenship and fraternity that unifies the entire communityin the pursuit of a common goal. In order to assert itself a nation-state needsto draw clearly etched borders so it can define itself in opposition to othernations, particularly when it comes to appeasing domestic constituencies.
Instead of the display of bravadoon either side of the Line of Control (LoC) and tall claims to isolate nations,we must learn to cross the frontiers of culture, nationality, and language inorder to make humanist responses to the belligerence of military powers. Ensuinghuman rights violations on either side of the divide are incredibly painful.
As long as Indo-Pakistanrelations remain strained, not only will the solution of the Kashmir questionrecede further and further into the background, but even the fragile peace inthe subcontinent will hang by a thin thread. Such a situation is obviouslyfraught with disastrous consequences not only for India and Pakistan but for theentire subcontinent.
Everyone needs to be open todiplomacy and peaceful negotiations to further the India-Pakistan peaceprocess. The aims of that process should be the phased withdrawal of forcesfrom both sides of the Line of Control dividing Kashmir, the rehabilitation ofdetained prisoners, and repair of the frayed ethnic fabric in all parts ofcivil society.
We have the resilience and thewherewithal to forge ahead without sabre rattling and braggadocio.
Jammu and Kashmir is a part ofthe subcontinent, and we cannot run away from this geographical reality.Unfortunately, our State has become a bone of contention between India andPakistan, and we are caught between a rock and a hard place.
It is, in the vital interest of J& K that these two countries should initiate dialogue, as opposed to war,with each other.
In civilized societies, politicaldissent is not curbed and national integrity is not maintained by militaryinterventions. The more military officials get involved in issues of politics,governance, and national interest, the more blurred the line between nationalinterest and hawkish national security becomes.
The imminent release of captured Indian Air force Pilot, Abhinandan Varthaman, by Pakistani authorities bodes well for South Asia and is a much needed prioritization of national interest and foreign policy over belligerent national security.