Less than half a century since Deng Xiaoping institutedChina’s ‘reform and opening up’ policy, Beijing’s economy has witnessedconsecutive decades of explosive growth allowing China to become the secondlargest economy in the world lagging only behind the US. According to latestdata provided by The Economic Times article on ‘China’s economic miracle’, theAsian giant’s economy multiplied itself by a factor of 42 between 1980 and 2017from $305 billion to $12.7 trillion. Just as Deng Xiaoping is credited withopening China’s economy to the world, so too has current premier Xi Jinpingcredited with giving diplomatic and military expression to mirror the country’seconomic rise. Since assuming the role of General Secretary of the CommunistParty of China in 2012, Xi has developed a narrative about China’s future thatis interwoven into the official state policy of “national rejuvenation” and itscorollary, restoring Beijing’s position of pre-eminence on the world stage.
Internally, the Communist Party has used education andpropaganda to drive this narrative home, spurring its 1.4 billion citizens towork harder and play their part in ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinesenation’. With Xi at the helm, the CPIhas set about achieving its two ‘centenary goals’. Firstly, to double thecountry’s GDP and per capita income relative to 2010 by 2021. Under thispolicy, the state has aimed to make China a moderately prosperous society tomark the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Communist party.Secondly, to turn China into a ‘prosperous, strong and advanced country’ by2049 to mark a centenary since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Externally, Chinese foreign policy formulations havereflected a return to Great Power rhetoric, a preference for bi-lateraldiplomacy with the state increasingly comfortable deploying its vast economicmight to aggressively develop its military capabilities as well as supplementits diplomatic overtures to achieve its strategic objectives. Beijing’schallenge to America’s hub and spokes security architecture in the Indo-Pacificregion represents a growing threat for policymakers in Washington given that the’rejuvenation’ of the PLA’s capabilities has also been supplemented withambitious economic statecraft allowing the state to expand its sphere ofinfluence through the acquisition of strategic sea ports across the GreaterIndian Ocean as part of its ‘string of pearls’ policy.
Concurrently, Beijing has channelled its vast economicresources towards the development of infrastructure, industry and directinvestment across Central and South-East Asia under the ‘Belt and Roadinitiative’ (BRI). The state has mobilised over $1.3 trillion in capital tofund the development of ports, railroads, power plants, dams and pipelines in70 countries spanning Asia, Europe and Africa making this initiative 12 timeslarger than the US’s post war Marshall plan for Europe. By providing unfetteredeconomic linkages between the East and West, China will create what Hass andRubenstein call a ’21st century dynamic whereby all roads lead to Beijing’.
If realised, the BRI will allow Beijing to position itselfas the most viable provider of economic architecture in the region. By offeringother South-East Asian and Central Asian powers access to the myriad of road,rail, pipeline and cable routes spanning the region that will be built as partof the project. BRI presents an explicit challenge to the currentWestern-Liberal global economic architecture.
Hass and Rubenstein in a paper entitled ‘The Trajectory ofChinese foreign policy…’ contend that China views its own rise as ‘leading to arestoration of the natural order of international relations, with Chinas as theworld’s largest economy and centre of global power’. Accordingly, as China’smaterial and soft power has grown, so too has its desire to accelerate progresstowards achieving this ultimate goal. Nowhere is the threat of Beijing’s new’confident extroversion’ and the threat this represents to the extant securityand global governance order more evident than in the South China Sea.
Hear the Dragon Roar
While Chinese policymakers have been careful not toexplicitly challenge the US and its regional partners through direct use ofmilitary force, they have shown a willingness to impose greater costs on theaforementioned nations in a manner that has exceeded their earlier responses.China’s physical seizure of Scarborough Shoal and its halting of certainstrategic imports headed for Manila after Philippines detained a Chinesefishing boat in disputed waters is an example of Beijing’s new ‘confident’extroversion.
As is Beijing’s banon rare earth exports to Japan in reaction to Tokyo’s enforcement of domesticmaritime law in what China considers ‘disputed waters’. Similarly, in 2015 Xi Jinping offered apublic commitment not to militarise the man-made islands that China wasconstructing on a chain of mostly coral reefs in the eastern South China Seacalled the Spratly islands. Despite this promise, Beijing has subsequentlyconstructed several military outposts on these islands with airstrips andharbours capable of hosting and servicing military aircraft and warships.
In late 2016, anti-aircraft guns and integrated air defencesystems called ‘close-in weapons systems’ (CIWS) were permanently installed inChina’s new military installation in the Spratly’s. In 2018, it was discoveredthat China has also deployed anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM’s) and long-rangesurface-to-air missiles (SAM’s) in at least three of its military structures inthe Spratly’s namely – Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. Inparticular, the installation of permanent offensive weapon systems on thesedisputed islands represents a direct challenge to US primacy in the region asit facilitates greater overseas deployment of Chinese troops allowing Beijingto expand its de facto sphere of influence in what are bitterly contestedwaters.
Beijing’s provocative responses to disputes with itsneighbouring nations in the South China Sea show its confidence in actingunilaterally. Moreover, China’s policy of asserting its territorial sovereigntyover the South China Sea stands in stark contrast to Washington’s and otherSouth-East Asian powers stated commitment to maintain freedom of navigation inthese waters. Moreover, as a waterbody through which the United NationsConference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates 1/3rd of global shippingpasses through, China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea serve as amicrocosm for the broader challenge that Pax Sinicapresents to the post-ColdWar US-led World order.
On 5th March 2018 the Ministry of Finance proposed an 8.1%increase in its defence spending, taking Beijing’s overall spending to 1.107trillion yuan ($174.6 billion), second only to that of the US $892 billion asper the latest spending bill signed by the Trump administration on 13th August2018. The state has used this money to implement several high-profileprocurement programs, military reforms, and institute doctrinal and structuralchanges within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese militaryacquisitions have been oriented towards allowing the PLA to win ‘local wars underhigh-technology conditions’. In particular, Beijing has sought to increase thePLA’s ability to conduct what Cooper III in a RAND report on ‘PLA MilitaryModernisation…’ calls ‘informatised, integrated joint operations’.
These key modernisation efforts by the Chinese army arecentred on replicating the US network-centric approach to warfare. Thisdevelopment in turn signals a recognition amongst Chinese policy makers that inorder to fully achieve its strategic objectives in the South China Sea, the Asianpower must prepare itself for a limited or full military confrontation withWashington. China’s assertiveness in pursuing its strategic objectives alsobelies a new determination to develop and use whatever resources the state hasat its disposal to rapidly enhance Beijing’s internal and external securityarchitecture.
China watchers attribute this new found assertiveness tohave been influenced in part by Beijing’s perception of a loss of nerve inWashington and their incompetent handling of geopolitical and economic affairsin the wake of 9/11. Emboldened by the leadership of Xi Jinping, Chinesepolicymakers have set loose the shackles self-imposed on them under the tenureof the previous Chinese premier, Deng Xiaoping. When viewed through this prism,China’s actions in the South China Sea re-iterate Xi Jinping’s message to theChinese populace, i.e. China’s ‘century of humiliation’ that begun with itsloss to Western powers in the Opium War (1840-42) is finally at an end.
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